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Abstract
This paper introduces the signed Choquet integral, i.e., a nonmonotonic gen-
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Keywords: Choquet integral, comonotonicity, arbitrage, time preference.
11 Introduction
This paper presents a non-monotonic generalization of the Choquet integral. The Choquet
integral provides a method of integration for nonadditive measures, and originates from
Choquet (1954). It was introduced in decision theory by Schmeidler (1982, 1989), and
it has since proved to be extremely useful. In decision under uncertainty, the context of
Schmeidler's paper, it leads to a generalization of expected utility that allows for nonad-
ditivity of probability (Gilboa, 1987; Wakker, 1989a,b; Nakamura, 1990). Theories based
on the Choquet integral are called \rank-dependent," and can explain Ellsberg and Allais
paradox behavior. They have been used by Tversky & Kahneman (1992) to develop a
theoretical model for their prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979); a similar model
was developed independently by Luce (1991) and Luce & Fishburn (1991).
For decision under risk, Choquet integration was used by Quiggin (1981), Yaari (1987),
Chateauneuf (1996), and others. Chateauneuf et al. (1996) uses Choquet integration to
price nancial assets on markets with frictions. The Choquet integral also proved useful
in other areas of decision theory. In welfare theory, it generalizes the Gini index and can
incorporate equity considerations (Weymark, 1981; Lopes, 1984; Ebert, 1987; Yaari, 1988;
Porath & Gilboa, 1994). In fuzzy set theory, decision-theoretic foundations have been
obtained (Wakker, 1990b; Murofushi & Sugeno, 1989). The Choquet integral has also
been used in game theory (Gilboa & Schmeidler, 1995; Haller, 1995; Lo, 1995; Mukerji &
Shin, 1996) and multi-period optimization (Gilboa, 1989; Shalev, 1994). Its mathematics
is explained by Fishburn (1988) and Denneberg (1994).
One characteristic property of Choquet integrals is monotonicity, i.e., increases of
the input lead to higher integral values. While monotonicity is imperative in many
contexts, it is naturally violated in other contexts. For instance, a welfare allocation
(10;10;10;10) ($10 for person 1, :::, $10 for person 4) is sometimes preferred to an allo-
cation (11;12;13;15) if envy and conﬂict can arise in the latter (Crosby, 1976; Tversky &
Grin, 1991). In multi-period optimization, Hsee & Abelson (1991) found that the major-
ity of subjects prefer a constant low income to a decreasing income ending with the same
2low income, even though the latter dominates the former in each time point. Kahneman
et al. (1993) found that subjects violate temporal monotonicity when choosing between
aversive episodes such as immersing hands in cold water. This paper presents a theory
that accommodates the described violations of monotonicity.
Section 2 introduces signed Choquet integrals, that generalize Choquet integrals by
permitting violations of monotonicity. The section presents necessary and sucient condi-
tions for a functional to be a signed Choquet integral, and also provides a characterization
in terms of preference conditions. Section 3 extends classical concavity and convexity
results to signed Choquet integrals. Sections 4 and 5 describe applications to asset pric-
ing in a context with uncertainty, and multi-period optimization, respectively. Proofs are
presented in the Appendix.
2 A characterization of signed Choquet integrals
We consider a nite set f1;:::;ng.E l e m e n t so fIR n are denoted as x or as (x1;:::;x n); they
represent functions from f1;:::;ng to IR. In the context of decision under uncertainty,
elements of f1;:::;ngare states (of nature). One state is true, the others are not true, and
it is not known which state is true. Functions x are acts,a na c txyielding xj if j is the true
state of nature. Because it is unknown which state is true, it is unknown which outcome
an act will yield. In the context of welfare theory, elements of f1;:::;ngdesignate persons,
and x designates an allocation that yields xj for person j. In the context of multi-period
optimization, elements of f1;:::;ngdesignate periods, and xj is the consumption/income
in period j. Other interpretations can be developed. This section, more or less arbitrarily,
adopts the terminology of decision under uncertainty; of course, its results are equally
relevant for the other contexts.
Acts x and y are comonotonic if there are no i;j such that xi >x j and yi <y j.F o r
any permutation  on f1;:::;ng,t h ecomonotonic cone C associated with  is dened
as fx 2 IR n : x (1)    x (n)g. Hence,  assigns to each rank-number j the state of
nature that has the j-th place in the rank-ordering with respect to outcomes. A subset of
3IR n is comonotonic if every pair of acts is comonotonic, which holds if and only if there is
a permutation  such that the subset is contained in the comonotonic cone C (Wakker,
1989b, Lemma VI.3.3). We consider general set functions v :2 f 1 ;:::;ng ! IR; it is permitted
that v takes negative values. v is a capacity if v(;)=0 ,v ( f 1 ;:::;ng) = 1, and v satises
monotonicity with respect to set inclusion, i.e., A  B ) v(A)  v(B); then v(A)  0
for all A. Capacities generalize probability measures because additivity with respect to
disjoint union is not imposed. A signed capacity v drops the monotonicity requirement,
i.e., v(;)=0a n dv ( f 1 ;:::;ng) = 1 are the only requirements. Thus, a signed capacity
can take negative values.
Let v be an arbitrary set function. For any x 2IR n, we dene
R
xdv, analogously to
the Choquet integral, as follows:
(i) Take a permutation  that is compatible with x, i.e., x(1) x (n).
(ii) Dene
(j) := v(f(1);:::;(j)g)−v(f(1);:::;(j−1)g)( 1 )





i=1 jxj is the signed Choquet integral of x with respect to v.
If xi = xj for some i 6= j, then the rank-ordering  is not uniquelydened. It is elementarily
veried that then any rank-ordering  that is compatible with x gives the same result, so
that the signed Choquet integral is well-dened after all. Note also that the integral
remains the same if we replace v by v0 = v − c for any constant c. In particular, one can
take v0 = v−v(;), i.e., one can restrict attention to set functions assigning 0 to the empty
set. The numbers j are called decision weights. In general, they can well be negative; they
are all nonnegative if and only if v is monotonic with respect to set inclusion. Because
v(f1;:::;ng) = 1 for signed capacities, the signed Choquet integral of (;:::;)w i t h
respect to a signed capacity is  for all 2IR.
In the following theorem we characterizesigned Choquet integrals, generalizing Schmei-
dler's (1986) representation (see also Anger, 1977, Theorem 3) to arbitrary set functions.
4The continuity condition imposed on the functional V in the theorem can be consider-
ably weakened. For instance, it suces to impose continuity at one point (;:::;), or
some boundedness or measurability restriction. The characteristic property of the signed
Choquet integral is comonotonic additivity, which for a general functional V means that
V (x+ y)=V( x )+V( y) whenever x and y are comonotonic. (If V (x + y)=V( x )+V( y)
for all x;y,t h e nw ec a l lV additive.)
THEOREM 1 V : IR n ! IR is a signed Choquet integral if and only if:
(1) V is continuous.
(2) V satises comonotonic additivity.
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Next we characterize preference relations that can be represented by signed Choquet
integrals when the set function is a signed capacity. A binary relation  on IR n is a weak
order if it is complete (x  y or y  x for all x;y) and transitive. It is continuous if
fx2IR n : x  y g and fx2IR n : x  y g are closed for all y2IR n.I ts a t i s  e scomonotonic
additivity if x  y implies x+z  y+z for all comonotonic x;y;z.( ;:::;)i sacertainty
equivalent of x if it is equal in preference to x.  is constant-monotonic if >)
( ;;)(;;) for all real ;. The assumption will imply that the set function
assigns value 1 to the state space. A function V represents  if x  y , V (x)  V (y).
COROLLARY 2 Let  be a binary relation on IR n. Then  can be represented by a signed
Choquet integral with respect to a signed capacity, if and only if:
(1)  is a weak order;
(2)  is continuous;
(3)  is constant-monotonic;
(4)  satises comonotonic additivity.
Further, the representing signed Choquet integral is uniquely determined.
2
53 Concavity and convexity
Throughout this section, we assume that V is a signed Choquet integral with respect to a
set function v.W ec o n s i d e rVas a function on IR n, and convexityand concavity properties
of V refer to mixtures of elements from IR n (and not to mixtures of set functions). We
call a set function v concave if
v(A[ B)+v( A\B)v( A )+v( B)( 2 )
for all A;B. v is convex if the reversed inequality holds.
It is elementarily veried that V satises positive homogeneity, i.e., V (x)=V (x)f o r
all >0. V is subadditive if V (x+ y)  V (x)+V( y) for all x;y.
THEOREM 3 The following four statements are equivalent.
(1) V is convex.
(2) V is subadditive.
(3) V is the maximum of dominated linear functionals.
(4) v is concave.
2
The equivalence of (1) and (4) adapts Proposition 3 of Schmeidler (1986) to signed
Choquet integrals. The following lemma prepares for Theorem 5 and is given in the main
text because it may have interest of its own.
LEMMA 4 Consider two signed Choquet integrals V and V 0, with respect to set functions
v and v0, respectively, satisfying v(;)=v 0( ; )=0and v(f1;:::;ng)=v 0( f 1 ;:::;ng). Then
V  V 0 , v  v0.
2
Lemma 4 will mostly be used in the special case where v0 is an additive set function.
THEOREM 5 Assume that v(;)=0 . Then the set function v is concave if and only if
V (x)=m a x f
R
xdj2P( v) g ,w h e r eP ( v )is the set of additive set functions  that lie
below v everywhere and satisfy (f1;:::;ng)=v ( f 1 ;:::;ng).
2
6Theorem 5 has been used by De Waegenaere et al. (1996). They describe a general
equilibrium model for asset trading on markets with dealers in which the equilibrium price
of an asset equals the signed Choquet integral of its payo with respect to an equilibrium
set function. Theorem 5 then allows to rewrite the equilibrium pricing rule in such a way
that the total cost of a portfolio can be written as a linear part (the price of the portfolio)
plus a subadditive part (the spread charged by the dealer).
OBSERVATION 6 Theorems 3 and 5 can be applied to −V and −v, resulting in sub-
stitution of the terms concave for convex, superadditive (V (x + y)  V (x)+V( y ) ) for
subadditive, minimum for maximum, dominating for dominated, above for below, and vice
versa.
2
4 An application to asset pricing
In the context of asset pricing, the elements of f1;2;:::;ngare states of nature. At date
zero, assets can be traded. At a later date, date one, exactly one of the states of nature will
turn out to be true, and the assets yield a payo depending on the true state. Therefore,
the payo of an asset at date one can be represented by a vector A 2 IR n.
A fundamental assumption made in asset pricing is that asset prices are arbitrage free,
i.e., they do not allow for arbitrage possibilities. Roughly speaking, there is an arbitrage
possibility if there exists a portfolio that has a non-positive price and yields non-negative
payos with certainty (i.e., whatever state will be true) and a positive payo in at least
one state of nature. More precisely, suppose that there are J assets with payo vectors
Aj 2 IR n and pricesqj 2 IR.L e tA2IR nJ and q 2 IR J denote the matrix of date one asset
payos and the row vector of date zero asset prices, respectively. Then the asset prices are
arbitrage free if there does not exist a portfolio z =( z 1;z 2;:::;z J)2IR J such that qz  0
and (Az)s  0 for all s 2f 1 ;2 ;:::;ngwith at least one strict inequality. The assumption
that asset prices are arbitrage free turns out to be extremelyuseful for asset pricing models.
It implies that there exists a probability measure (not necessarily unique) such that the
price of an asset equals the expected value of its payo with respect to this measure
7discounted by the price of a riskless bond with payo one in each state. This probability
measure is called a risk neutral probability measure. A risk neutral probability measure
can easily be determined from observed asset prices and, consequently, any portfolio can
be priced by simply calculating the expected value of its discounted payo.
For frictionless markets, the assumption that asset prices are arbitrage free is complete-
ly justied. Indeed, when an arbitrage possibility were to exist on a frictionless market
then nothing would prevent the agents from exploiting this arbitrage possibility and hence
the market will not be in equilibrium. In realistic settings, however, asset trading is often
subject to constraints such as leverage constraints or no-overinsurance constraints, and
mostly occurs through the intermediation of brokers or dealers charging a price for their
intermediation. The existence of such frictions can disturb the no-arbitrage relation of
asset prices because agents may simply not be able to exploit a potential arbitrage possi-
bility. This implies that many of the models that are used in practice should in fact not
be used under the presence of frictions, since they rely heavily on the no-arbitrage relation
of asset prices. Hence, there is a need for an alternative to the traditional no-arbitrage
pricing rule for the case of markets with frictions. De Waegenaere et al. (1996) develops
a general equilibrium model for asset trading on markets with dealers charging bid-ask
spreads. Theorem 7 is used there to prove that an equilibrium set function v exists on
the state space such that the equilibrium asset prices equal the signed Choquet integral of
their payo with respect to this set function.
The following example illustrates how one obtains a pricing rule that is applicable to
markets with frictions by replacing the Lebesque integral appearing in no-arbitrage pricing
by the more general signed Choquet integral. The standard general equilibrium model on
incomplete asset markets on which this example is based can be found in Magill & Shafer
(1991).
EXAMPLE 7 We consider a two period asset market model with dealers charging bid-ask
spreads. For each portfolio there is a buying price and a selling price and the dierence
between these two prices is the bid-ask spread. There are two assets that can be traded
8in the rst period (date zero), and payo takes place in the second period (date one).
There are two states of nature in this second period, i.e., n = 2. A consumption bundle of
an agent therefore consists of a vector (x0;x 1;x 2)2IR 3
+,w h e r ex 0denotes the amount of
money the agent owns at date zero, x1 denotes the amount of money he will own at date
one if state one occurs, and x2 denotes the amount of money he will own at date one if state
two occurs. The endowment (before trading) of the agents is given by w1 = w2 =( 4 ;3 ;3).
Since there are two states at date one, the payo of an asset can be represented by a vector
in IR 2. The payo vectors for the two assets are given by A1 =( 1 ; 0) and A2 =( 0 ; 1),
respectively. Hence, asset 1 pays o one if state 1 is true at date one and zero if state 2 is
true, and the reverse holds for asset 2.
As stated before, the assets can only be traded through the intermediation of a dealer.
For trading a portfolio z =( z 1 ;z 2)2IR 2, i.e., buying z1 units of asset 1 (or selling −z1
if z1 is negative), and buying z2 units of asset 2, the dealer charges an amount q(z)=
z + γjz2 − z1j, for given  2 IR 2 and γ  0. Thus, q(z) consists of a linear part z,
which is the \price," augmented by a subadditive, positive part γjz2−z1j representing the
\risk-premium" charged by the dealer for his intermediation. Since then q(z) > −q(−z)
for all portfolios with a risky payo (i.e., z1 6= z2), the dealer makes a prot by buying this
portfolio from one agent and selling it to the other. In this example, the dealer's rm is
owned by agent 2, hence the dealer's prot, denoted d, is returned to agent 2 after trade.
Since prices for portfolios have to be paid at date zero, the trade of portfolio zi 2IR 2 by
agent i has the following eect on his resources:
xi
0 = wi















where 1 =0a n d 2= 1 denote the shares of the respective agents in the dealer's prot.
Now, using their initial resources wi, the agents can trade asset portfolios z =( z 1;z 2)i n














9In addition to the presence of the dealer, there is another restriction on the trading
possibilities of the agents. Agent one is only allowed to buy portfolios z =( z 1;z 2) satisfying
z1 + z2  1 and agent two is only allowed to buy portfolios z =( z 1;z 2) satisfying z1  1.
Now let xi2IR 3
+ and zi2IR 2 denote the consumption bundle and the asset portfolio that
agent i will choose as a result of his utility maximizing problem for a given d,f o ri=1 ;2.
It can easily be shown that, for

d =0 : 87
 =( − 0 : 855;1:145)
γ =0 : 145
x1 =( 1 ;2 ;5);x
2 =( 7 ;4 ;1)
z
1 =( − 1 ;2);z
2 =( 1 ;− 2);
the market is in equilibrium. That is, both agents have maximized their utility, the
market in assets and money clears (i.e., there is no excess demand or excess supply), and
the dealer's prot equals d = q((−1;2)) + q((1;−2)).
Now dene the set function v on 2f1;2g as follows: v(;)=0 ;v(f1g)=− 0 : 71, v(f2g)=
1 : 29, and v(f1;2g)=0 : 29. Then it immediately follows that q(z)=
R
zdv for all z 2IR 2,
i.e., the equilibrium price of a portfolio equals the signed Choquet integral of its payo.
Moreover, it is clear that since 1 is negative, these equilibrium asset prices cannot be
represented by a Choquet integral with respect to a monotone set function (e.g. a capacity
as in Chateauneuf et al., 1996). Because of the risk premium, prices are nonlinear and
cannot be represented by a linear integral either. So, in this case, only the extension to
signed Choquet integrals yields the desired result. This example shows that traditional no-
arbitrage pricing is not always suitable to represent equilibriumasset prices. The extension
from discounted expected values to signed Choquet integrals does yield a solution.
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105 An application to multi-period decisions
Gilboa (1989) initiated the application of Choquet integrals to multiperiod decisions. He
was motivated by the nding that preferences do not satisfy separability over time (Kreps
& Porteus, 1978; Loewenstein & Elster, 1992), a phenomenon that underlies habit forma-
tion in economics (Constantinides, 1990). For example, people are sensitive to changes in
income (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1991; Loewenstein & Elster, 1992). Decreases in income
are valued highly negative. The Choquet integral can model dependency on orderings
of outcomes, and thus sensitivity towards increases and decreases of income. Gilboa de-
rived a special, \Markovian," version of the Choquet integral where the utility of current
income can depend on the income of the previous period (Kahneman & Thaler, 1991).
He retained the classical monotonicity condition of Choquet integrals and did not permit
actual decreases of utility in income. There is, however, evidence that sensitivity towards
the pattern of income can be so strong as to overrule even monotonicity (Hsee & Abelson,
1991). A person may prefer an income pattern (10, 10) to the income pattern (11, 10) so
as to avoid the decrease in the second period.
Shalev (1994) developed a model that permits such violations of monotonicity. We will
demonstrate that his model is in fact a special case of signed Choquet integration and
we use that observation to present a simplied analysis. Our functional thus provides a
common generalization of the ones of Gilboa (1989) and Shalev (1994). One dierence
between our model and theirs is that we assume linearity directly in outcomes, whereas
they assume that outcomes are probability distributions over prizes and then use expected
utility over those, i.e., they use linearity with respect to probabilistic mixtures rather than
with respect to quantitative outcomes.
The set f1;:::;ngnow designates a set of periods, and an n-tuple is an income prole.
Shalev introduced the following, basic, condition. Two income proles x;y are sequentially
comonotonic if there are no two adjacent time periods s;s+1suchthatxs >y sand ys+1 >
xs+1. A set of income proles is sequentially comonotonic if every pair in it is so. The
preference relation  satises sequential additivity if x  y implies x+z  y+z whenever
11fx;y;zg is sequentially comonotonic. Obviously, if income proles are comonotonic then
they are also sequentially comonotonic. Hence, sequential additivity implies comonotonic
additivity.




[jxj − j(xj−1 − xj)
+]( 3 )
where the js sum to one, and for any real number  we dene + =m a x f 0 ;g. Such a
functional is called a sequential Choquet integral.
Formula (3) is based on the idea that a regular weighted sum applies if the sequence
is increasing, i.e., if xj >x j − 1for all j. However, for decreases there is a \decision weight
penalty," that is, if xj−1 >x j, then decision weight j is shifted from xj−1 to the lower
outcome xj, leading to subtraction of a term j(xj−1 − xj). In extreme cases, the jsm a y
be so large that violations of monotonicity result. The terminology in this interpretation
is adapted from the example of income valuation, where preference is monotonic if income
is increasing (j > 0 for all j), but for decreases in salary a \penalty" is subtracted, i.e.,
j > 0 for all j. The following analysis also considers the general case of negative jsa n d
 js.
Let us next explain that a sequential Choquet integral is a signed Choquet integral
indeed. The decision weights j, dened in Formula (1) in Section 2, are as follows, where
we consider four cases (and x0 = −1, xn+1 = 1):
(1) j = j if xj−1 <x j<x j +1.
(2) j = j + j if xj−1 >x j and xj <x j +1.
(3) j = j − j+1 if xj−1 <x j and xj >x j +1.
(4) j = j + j − j+1 if xj−1 >x j>x j +1.
If there is an identity between xj and xj−1 or xj+1, then the rank-ordering of these
outcomes, and the belonging case above, can be chosen arbitrarily. The belonging signed
12capacity satises v(i)= i− i +1 (n+1 = 0) for all i. For a \connected" set E = fi;i +
1;;i+kg,v(E)= i++ i+k− i+k+1.N o t et h a tvassigns value 0 to the empty set,
and value 1 to the entire state space, hence it is a signed capacity indeed. For a general
set E, v(E) can be seen to be the sum of the capacities of the separate components of E.






j 2 E : j +162E
j+1:
We conclude:
LEMMA 8 The functional in Equation (3) is a signed Choquet integral.
2
An alternative interpretation can be given, where a sequential Choquet integral is a
weighted sum, adjusted for variations between consecutive terms. The following formula




(p(sj)xj + jjxj − xj−1j): (4)











Then use the following substitutions: j = −j=2f o rj=2 ;:::;n, p(s 1)= 1− 2 = 2,
p(sj)= j+ j = 2− j +1=2f o rj=2 ;:::;n−1, and p(sn)= n+ n = 2. Formula (4)
was used by Gilboa (1989) for sequential \nonsigned" Choquet integrals. Yet another,
equivalent, formula was used by Shalev (1994, Theorem 1).
THEOREM 9 Let  be a binary relation on IR n. It can be represented by a sequential
Choquet integral with respect to a signed capacity if and only if
(1)  is a weak order;
(2)  is continuous;
(3)  is constant-monotonic;
13(4)  satises sequential additivity.
The sequential Choquet integral is uniquely determined.
2
The functional, characterized in Theorem 9, is of the form characterized by Gilboa
(1989) if we add monotonicity: x  y whenever xj  yj for all j. The case in which all
jsa n d js are nonnegative is most interesting for the application to income evaluation.
Positive js are characterized by imposing the monotonicity condition only on income




(x+b;;x+b)(x+b;;x+b;x + a + b;x;x+b;;x+b),
where the (j−1)th and jth coordinate have been boldprinted, and a and b are nonnegative.
In this preference condition, the second preference has been generated by raising the rst
j −1i n c o m e sb yat e r ma+b . That implies a decrease in income in time period j,w h i c h
generates a lower valuation of the right-hand income prole.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. First we demonstrate necessity of conditions (1) and (2). Con-
tinuity is obvious. Comonotonic additivity follows because the signed Choquet integral
is linear on each comonotonic cone C and because every comonotonic triple x;y;z is
contained in one such cone.
Henceforth, we assume conditions (1) and (2) and prove that V is a signed Choquet
integral. We rst restrict attention to the comonotonic cone of the form fx : x1 
x ng, associated with the identity permutation .H e r e Vsatises additivity (i.e., \Cauchy's
14equation"). Because V is continuous, it is linear on the cone, i.e., there exist real numbers
1;:::; n such that V (x)= 1x 1++ nx n on this cone.
Similarly, for every permutation , V satises Cauchy's equation on the belonging cone
and there exist 1;;:::; n; such that V (x)= 1 ;x1 + + n;xn on this cone. For any
subset E of f1;:::;ng, we dene v(E) as follows: First take a permutation  such that
E = f(1);:::;(k)g, next dene v(E)a st h es u mo f 1 ;;:::; k;. The major conceptual
point in this proof is to note that the denition of v is independent of . That easily
follows because v(E)=V(1E)w h e r e1 Edenotes the indicator function of E. Therefore, v
is well-dened indeed. The ks are related to v by the formula
k; = v(1;;:::; k;) − v(1;;:::; k−1;);
in agreement with Formula (1), and the theorem follows.
2
Proof of Corollary 2. Necessity of conditions (1) { (4) is obvious; comonotonic
additivity of  follows from comonotonic additivity of the signed Choquet integral. Hence
we assume conditions (1) { (4) and derive the representation.
We identify real numbers (outcomes) and constant acts (constant n-tuples), and rst
prove that every act has a unique certainty equivalent. Suppose, for contradiction, that
there exists an act x such that x   for each constant act . For any natural number
n, x=n  =n (x=n  =n would imply, because of comonotonicity and comonotonic
additivity, 2x=n  =n + x=n  2=n, and then, by induction, m  x=n  m  =n for
all natural numbers m;f o rm=na contradiction would result). As this holds for all real
numbers ,w ei nf a c th a v ex=n   for all real numbers . Limit taking for n !1
and continuity of  then imply 0   for each real number , contradicting constant
monotonicity. Contradiction similarly results if x   for all real . Hence, for each act
x there exist real numbers ; such that   x  .B y c o n t i n u i t y , f γ 2 IR : γ  xg
and fγ2IR : γ  xg are closed, we have already seen that both sets are nonempty, hence
by connectedness of IR they must intersect. Their intersection contains the certainty
equivalent of x. It is unique because of constant monotonicity.
15We dene, for each act x, V (x) as its certainty equivalent. By constant-monotonicity,
this function represents .C o n s i d e rV( x )a n dV( y ), for comonotonic x;y.T h e nxV( x )
implies x+y  V (x)+y. (Note here that each constant act is comonotonic with each other
act.) y  V (y) implies V (x)+yV(x)+V(y). Transitivity implies x+y  V (x)+V(y).
Hence V (x + y)=V( x )+V( y ). V is continuous because fx : V (x)  g = fx : x 
(;:::;)g and fx : V (x)  g = fx : x  (;:::;)g are closed for all , because of
continuity of . By Theorem 1, V is a signed Choquet integral.
For uniqueness of the representation, note that the signed capacity v assigns value 1 to
the state space, hence the signed Choquet integral assigns value  to each constant act .
That uniquely denes the representing signed Choquet integral as the certainty equivalent
of each act.
2
Proof of Theorem 3. First we prove equivalence of (1) and (2). Because V is con-
tinuous, convexity holds if and only if midpoint convexity holds, therefore we consider
midpoint convexity. We have










V( x )+V( y)
2
where the last step applies positive homogeneity to the left-hand side.
Equivalence of (1) and (3) is well-known, even holding for general functions V ; it will
not be proved here. We nally turn to the equivalence of (1) and (4). We rst prove that
convexity of V implies concavity of v. Consider any two subsets A;B of f1;:::;ng.T h e n
v ( A [ B )+v( A\B)=V(1A[B)+V(1A\B) = (because 1A[B and 1A\B are comonotonic)
V (1A[B +1 A \ B) = (because 1A[B +1 A \B =1 A+1 B)V(1A +1 B)(because V is convex
and hence, as shown before, subadditive) V (1A)+V(1B)=v ( A )+v( B).
We nally turn to the hardest part of the proof, i.e., the demonstration that (4) implies
(1). Consider an act (x1;:::;x n) and any rank-ordering .L e t 1 ;:::; n be the decision
weights corresponding to . It is not assumed that the rank-ordering is compatible with
x1;:::;x n, it is just any arbitrary rank-ordering. Consider the sum
1x1 + + nx n: (5)
16This sum need not be the V value of x because  need not be compatible with x.W en e x t
show:
LEMMA 10 For any given x, (5) attains its maximum over  at any  compatible with x.
The proof of the lemma is based on the following idea. Under concavity of v,m o r e
decision weight is assigned to a state as it moves up in ranking. Then the sum in (5) gets
higher as more decision weight is shifted to the higher outcomes, i.e., as the permutation
to generate the decision weights agrees more with the rank-ordering of x.
To prove the lemma in detail, assume that  is an arbitrary rank-ordering, and consider
a second rank-ordering 0 that is almost identical to . The only dierence is that 0
reversed two consecutively ordered states, hence a = (i)= 0( i +1) andb = (i+1) = 0(i)
for some i.L e t 0
1 ;:::;0







with the sum in (5). Obviously, 0















b = a + b:
Consequently, the only dierence between the decision weights k and 0
k is that some
decision weight has been reshifted between states a and b.I f x a= x b , then (5) and (6)
yield the same result as it does not matter how the total decision weight for states a and
b is distributed between xa and xb. Next assume that xb >x a.T h e n 0agrees better with
the rank-ordering of x than .N o w
 0
b b
17follows because of concavity of v. This is seen by letting D denote the set of states rank-
ordered before a and b, substituting A = D [f a gand B = D [f b gin Equation (2), and
reshifting terms. Moving state b one up in ranking increases its decision weight, so that
under 0 more of the common decision weight of a and b is assigned to the higher outcome
xb. Therefore, concavity of v implies that (6)  (5).
This inequality is the central step in the proof of Lemma 10, and the implication
(4))(1). We conclude that making a rank-ordering agree more with the rank-ordering
of an act (in the sense of a basic permutation of interchanging two consecutive states),
increases the weighted sum assigned to the act which proves Lemma 10. QED
Now consider a convex combination rx +( 1−r ) yof x and y. Then the V value of
rx +( 1−r) yis
1(rx1 +( 1−r) y 1)++ n(rxn +( 1−r) y n)
where the decision weights are derived from the rank-ordering of rx +( 1−r ) y .T h e V
value can be rewritten as
r[1x1 + + nx n]+( 1−r )[1y1 + + ny n]: (7)
By Lemma 10, (7) becomes larger when the decision weights for the coordinates of x are
replaced by the decision weights compatible with x, and similar for y,a sw es a wb e f o r e .
Hence, (7)  rV(x)+( 1−r ) V( y) :
We conclude that
V (rx +( 1−r) y)rV (x)+( 1−r ) V( y) ;
i.e., V is convex.
2
Proof of Lemma 4. That V  V 0 implies v  v0 follows immediately by restriction to
indicator functions. Next assume that v  v0. The signed Choquet integral V (x)c a nb e
rewritten, for  compatible with x,a s
n − 1 X
j =1
v(f(1);:::;(j)g)(x(j) − x(j+1))+v( f  (1);:::;(n)g)x (n):
18This formula shows that V (x)  V 0(x)i fvv 0.
Note that the equality v(f1;:::;ng)=v 0( f 1 ;:::;ng), is essential in the proof to ensure
that x(n) has the same weight for both V and V 0 in the displayed formula (both if it is
positive and if it is negative).
2
Proof of Theorem 5. By Lemma 4, V (x)  supf
R
xdj2P( v) g . Dene  as the
additive set function that assigns to each single state j the value equal to the decision
weight of j for a rank-ordering  that is compatible with x. By the denition of the signed
Choquet integral, V (x)=
R
xd,a n d ( f 1 ;:::;ng)=v ( f 1 ;:::;ng). Hence it remains to
be demonstrated that v  . This follows from Lemma 10, when applied to indicator
functions. The supremum is taken at  2P ( v ), hence it is a maximum.
2
Proof of Theorem 9. Throughout this proof we use the notational convention that,
for all x2IR n, x 0 = −1 and xn+1 = 1.
As a tool in the proof, we dene a change vector c as an n+1-tuple with c1 =+=c n +1,
and for each j either cj is + or cj is −. For every change vector c, Cc contains all x such
that for all j  2, xj  xj−1 if cj =+a n dx j − 1x jif cj = −. Cc is sequentially
comonotonic. Note that x belongs to several Ccsi fx j=x j − 1for some j. The constant
income proles belong to all sets Cc. Cc is the union of all rank-ordered cones whose
change vector agrees with c. Cc is a convex cone because weak inequalities are kept under
convex combinations.
LEMMA 11 As e tEIR n is sequentially comonotonic if and only if it is contained in
one set Cc.
Proof. Cc, and thus any of its subsets, is sequentially comonotonic. Next assume that
E is any sequentially comonotonic set. We dene the change vector c. Consider three,
exclusive and exhaustive, cases as follows.
(1) There is x2E with xi >x i − 1. Then, by sequential consistency, yi  yi−1 for all y2E.
We dene ci =+ .
19(2) There is x2E with xi <x i − 1. Then, by sequential consistency, yi  yi−1 for all y2E.
We dene ci = − in this case.
(3) xi = xi−1 for all i.T h e nc ican be chosen arbitrarily.
We now have E  C c. QED
LEMMA 12 A sequential Choquet integral V is additive on any set Cc.
Proof. Within one set Cc, we can use the same decision weights j, dened before Lemma
8, for all Choquet integral calculations of V . Hence V is additive there. QED
After these preparations, we turn to the proof of the theorem. First assume the repre-
sentation. Necessity of preference conditions (1), (2), and (3) is obvious, and (4) follows
from Lemmas 11 and 12.
Next we assume Conditions (1) to (4), and derive the sequential Choquet integral
representation. By the proof of Corollary 2, there exists a certainty equivalent V (x)f o r
each income prole x,a n dV represents preference. In fact, by the Corollary, V is a signed
Choquet integral and satises additivity within each comonotonic cone. We prove, in a
number of steps, that the decision weights of V are as for a sequential Choquet integral.
STEP 1. The decision weights depend only on the change vector c.
We demonstrate that V satises additivityon larger domains than comonotonic subsets,
i.e., on whole sets Cc. By sequential additivity, for x;y 2 Cc, x  (;;)a n dy
( ;;) impliesx+y  (;;)+y  (;;)+(;;), which implies V (x+y)=
+=V( x )+V( y). In other words, the continuous functional V satises additivity on
the convex cone Cc. Hence it is linear there. That implies that there are \decision weights"
c
j such that V (x)=
P n
j =1 c
jxj on Cc. By uniqueness, the decision weights of the signed
Choquet integral on all comonotonic cones contained within Cc must coincide with the
cs. Therefore, the term decision weight is justied for these numbers. The reasoning
shows that the decision weights in the signed Choquet integral are fully determined by the
change vector of an income prole.
STEP 2. The jth decision weight depends only on cj and cj+1.
20We have seen, in signed Choquet integrals, that a decision weight j does not depend
on all of the rank-ordering, but only on the \dominating set" of states i that are rank-
ordered before j. Step 2 in this proof is similar. For j, and a change vector c0,c o n s i d e r
the convex cone of income proles x such that
 x1 = =x j−1;
x j−1 and xj are ordered in agreement with c0
j (hence xj  xj−1 if c0
j =+ ,x jx j − 1 if
c0
j = −);
 xj and xj+1 are ordered in agreement with c0
j+1;
 xj+1 = =x n.
This cone is at least two-dimensional (unless n = 1, but for that case the theorem is
trivial). It is the intersection of all cones Cc that have cj = c0
j and cj+1 = c0
j+1. Hence
V (x)=axj−1 +bxj +dxj+1 for uniquely determined weights a;b;d on this cone. It follows
that c
j = b for any change vector c with cj = c0
j and cj+1 = c0





n). Hence the decision weight c
j does not depend on all of the change
pattern c, but only on cj and cj+1.
STEP 3. If c and c0 dier only on the jth coordinate, say cj =+a n dc 0
j=− ,t h e n c 0
j − c
j
is independent of c and c0; this dierence is called the jth decision weight penalty,a n di s
denoted as j.
We will now prove that j is independent of c and c0 indeed, for c and c0 as just
described. j can be interpreted as the decision weight, taken o j−1 when outcome xj
falls below xj−1. Because each decision weight i depends only on the ith and (i + 1)th
coordinate of the change vector, c
i = c0





j , and hence c0
j−1 = c
j−1 − j. In other words, changing the change
vector c only on its jth coordinate generates a decision weight shift from the (j − 1)th
coordinate to the jth coordinate and leaves all other decision weights unaected.
Because the decision weights of the jth coordinate are independent of c's coordinates
other than cj and cj+1, c0
j and c
j, thus also their dierence j, depend only on cj and cj+1.
In particular, j is independent of c1;;c j−1. Similarly, c0
j−1 and c
j−1, thus also their
21dierence j, depend only on cj−1 and cj. In particular, j is independent of cj+1;;c n.
We conclude that j is independent of c1;:::;c j−1;c j+1;:::;c n, so it is independent of c
and c0.
STEP 4. Denition of js.
Dene, for c0 =( + ; ;+), j = c0
j for all j. In the context of income evaluation,
these are the decision weights for the empirically most favorable case where income always
increases.
The decision weight c
j depends only on cj and cj+1, and is as follows.
(1) If cj =+a n dc j +1 =+ ,t h e n c
j = j, by the denition of j.
(2) If cj = − and cj+1 =+ ,t h e n c
j= j+ j, by (1) and Step 3.
(3) If cj =+a n dc j +1 = −,t h e n c
j= j− j +1, by (1) and Step 3.
(4) If cj = − and cj+1 = −,t h e n c
j= j+ j− j +1, by (2) (or (3)) and Step 3.
By substitution (see also before Lemma 8) it now follows that V is as in Formula (3),
i.e., it is a sequential Choquet integral. Uniqueness follows from Corollary 2.
2
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